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Abstract 
How should courts supervise health service resource allocation? Although practice varies widely, four 
broad approaches can be represented on a matrix comparing, on two axes, (a) individual-community 
rights and (b) substantive-procedural remedies. Examples from each compartment of the matrix are 
discussed and, although the community-procedural approach is recommended as a general rule, a range 
of other responses within the matrix may also be desirable.
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Introduction
All over the world, public welfare services are 
struggling as “structural adjustment” reduces 
the resources available to public authorities.1 
In the past, governments could raise domestic 
taxes to respond to welfare demand. Now, their 
revenue-raising capacity is diminishing, especial-
ly from the wealthiest and most mobile sources.2 
Instead, governments are turning to international 
credit to support public services.3 Today, private 
investors’ rights to bond repayments compete for 
priority over public rights to social welfare.4 As de-
mand for care accelerates, both from older patients 
living longer with chronic illness and younger ones 
suffering from our “obesogenic” environment, the 
tax-state is also becoming the debt-state.5 While the 
subject of this article is health care, its context is of 
mounting pressure on health care systems precisely 
as demand for care is expanding faster than ever. 
While we may endorse the World Health Organi-
zation’s strong advice for governments to increase 
public investment in health and health care, the fu-
ture for public services is more probably of greater 
austerity.6 And as competition for limited resources 
intensifies, judges are more likely to be called upon 
to resolve the tension. How should they do so? What 
logic separates the choices before them, and what 
are the implications for patients and systems as a 
whole of the judicial policies adopted? In particu-
lar, is the “judicialization” of health care a help or a 
hindrance, friend or foe?7 We discuss (a) framework 
issues common to claims made upon public welfare 
systems everywhere, and (b) a resource allocation 
rights matrix to assist clarity in the debate.
Framework issues
Before turning to the rights matrix, what are the 
“framework” issues common to claims arising 
within public welfare systems generally? Assuming 
the decision-maker is an authority with duties to 
serve the public, the following three factors are 
surely axiomatic. 
Opportunity costs engage rights
Because demand for care generally exceeds the 
public resources available, investment in one part 
of the system may require disinvestment from an-
other. Judgments about resource allocation are not 
based on objective equations or immutable logic, 
but on a balance of ethical, legal, therapeutic, so-
cial, and economic values about which reasonable 
people differ. The term “commissioning” captures 
the responsibility to promote the interests not just 
of individuals (the usual priority of bioethics), but 
of whole communities of people over the longer 
term. It expresses concern for social citizenship in 
which we all share common interests with a com-
munity of others.8 
For health care commissioners, this involves 
decisions about the opportunity costs involved in 
promoting social and economic rights. For example, 
how should we allocate resources between neonatal 
care, pediatric care, orthopedic care, oncology, and 
cardiology care? Should patients wait for hospital 
care for 18 days, 18 weeks, or 18 months? Should 
we focus less on individual patients after illness 
has struck, or promote community health before 
people become ill? These are crucial questions in 
bioethics (although they have been “almost totally 
ignored”), but they also engage rights.9 We require 
responses that recognize social and economic rights 
as enforceable positive rights yet devise remedies 
that respect the “public” dimension of the claim in 
terms of opportunity costs. 
Positive rights are justiciable
Judges must surely retain supervisory authority 
over competing claims of this nature. The chal-
lenge is to find the proper balance between judicial 
usurpation of executive authority on the one hand 
and a complete abdication of judicial responsibility 
on the other.10 This suggests that, although positive 
rights remain within judicial supervision, appro-
priate remedies must differ from those available for 
civil and political rights claims. Whereas civil and 
political rights are enforceable impartially and gen-
erally by us all, social and economic rights engage 
issues of distributive justice between people who 
may have competing interests, where the needs 
of the most underprivileged are often prominent. 
This distinction suggests that whereas civil and 
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political rights are amenable to substantive judicial 
enforcement, social and economic rights give rise to 
different concerns. For the latter, procedural reme-
dies are more often appropriate to accommodate 
the politics inherent in promoting social welfare 
policy.11 In the Constitutional Court of South Afri-
ca, Justice Albie Sachs explained the difference in a 
case concerning the allocation of scarce lifesaving 
kidney dialysis. An individual rights approach was 
insufficient to solve the problem. When others also 
have legitimate interests in the same resource, the 
court must reflect our human interdependence by 
accommodating the competing rights and interests 
of other people. This is not to undermine or dilute 
the notion of rights, rather:
When rights by their very nature are shared and 
interdependent, striking appropriate balances 
between equally valid entitlements or expectations 
of a multitude of claimants should not be seen as 
imposing limitations on those rights…, but as 
defining the circumstances in which rights may 
most fairly and effectively be enjoyed.12
Take the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). In respect of civil and political rights, 
the same principles of freedom of speech apply 
throughout Europe, east and west, irrespective of 
the differences in gross domestic product (GDP). 
Thus, despite the differences in national wealth, 
German and Romanian citizens should enjoy the 
same rights of freedom of expression, assembly, 
and religion. However, this is not true of social 
and economic rights. Inevitably, access to public 
health, housing, education, and social welfare dif-
fers significantly throughout Europe. This is not to 
say that social and economic rights do not exist in 
countries with a smaller GDP, or that their courts 
cannot enforce them. Rather, their legitimacy must 
be recognized within these constraints, without 
ignoring the rights of other people. The High 
Court of Israel refers to them as “budget-dependent 
rights” in which “the scope and extent of realiza-
tion of the right to health and medical treatment is 
subject to the economic capability of the state and 
the resources at its disposal.”13 Unless we acknowl-
edge this difference, an individualist approach to 
social and economic rights will damage precisely 
the communities and public institutions most in 
need of protection.14 The concern is not that social 
and economic rights are non-justiciable; it is how 
best to avoid the collision with “negative rights” so 
as to respond properly to everyone’s needs, rather 
than the needs of articulate litigants in particular.
Access rights are equality rights
The state treads a delicate line between protecting 
liberty on the one hand and promoting equality on 
the other. If the starting point is “individualistic” 
and premised on the belief that the state is a neces-
sary evil needed only to protect civil and political 
rights (as with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke), 
then the conclusion will differ radically from 
those who believe we are born into communities 
with social rights, mutual interests, and shared 
obligations of citizenship (as with Aristotle and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau). Take an example that has 
troubled a number of health care systems. Concern 
is expressed that the public interest in a fair public 
health service is undermined if wealthier patients 
can jump the queue for services by accessing faster 
or better treatment through private care. Resources 
otherwise available to the public may be diverted 
into private practice, and the integrity of public sec-
tor care may be diluted. Waiting times in the public 
system may lengthen, the numbers of doctors and 
nurses in the wards may shorten, public support for 
the service may decline, and the ethical commit-
ment to equality may be compromised. Confidence 
in the system may be undermined so that the ser-
vice loses credibility. 
Both the province of Quebec and the state of 
Israel responded to this problem in broadly similar 
ways. In Quebec, regulations made the market for 
private health insurance unlawful so as to protect 
the integrity of the public health care system. In 
Israel, since 1996, patients had been permitted to 
make extra payments to public hospitals to pur-
chase the right to see the doctor of their choice. As 
in Quebec, this created a conflict between a right 
to buy care in a free market on the one hand and 
the principle that patients should be treated equally 
according to their need, by the staff best qualified 
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to do so, on the other. So the attorney general of 
Israel declared the practice illegal in 2002.15 Both 
of these social policy responses were challenged. 
The difference in judicial reaction is illuminating. 
In Chaoulli v  Attorney Generals of Quebec and 
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court held that 
individual rights effectively “trump” public policy 
concerns, at least until there was cogent evidence 
that substantial harm would be done otherwise.16 It 
struck down the Quebec regulation for infringing 
the private rights of individuals to enter the market 
for health insurance by obliging people to wait lon-
ger for treatment in the public system. By contrast, 
in Kiryati v. Attorney General,the Supreme Court 
of Israel was troubled by a scheme which permitted 
public health services to be supplemented by private 
payments.17 Public hospitals should treat patients 
equally, according to their need rather than their 
ability to pay. Yet permitting wealthier patients 
to divert doctors from other, more needy patients 
undermined this ideal. Thus, the court upheld the 
attorney general’s decision as a legitimate measure 
promoting the fun damental principles of the public 
health care system in Israel.18
Tushnet says of the Canadian decision that it is 
based on “an unstated assumption that the default 
remedy is always reversion to the institutions of the 
private market economy.”19 Hutchinson criticizes 
the decision in similar fashion:
Chaoulli… is energised by a political ideology 
which encompasses, amongst other things, that 
individual entitlements are more important than 
social responsibilities, that negative liberty is to 
be promoted at the expense of positive liberty, 
that people’s capacity to exercise their rights is a 
matter of choice rather than circumstance and that 
legislatures… are the breeding grounds of capricious 
and arbitrary decision-making… This political 
vision… is highly individualistic  and anti-state…20
Courts more comfortable protecting individual 
liberty will be challenged by policies that constrain 
economic rights in order to promote equality and 
social citizenship. Nevertheless, it is surely axi-
omatic that public health systems should promote 
everyone’s interests equally, and we need to be can-
did that these matters of distributive ethics often 
involve political compromises.21 The commitment 
to equality should have regard for the needs of par-
ticular patients today, but also to the sustainability 
of the system for those who need treatment in the 
future. It is to the balance between political priori-
ties and legal rights that we now turn.
A priority-setting rights matrix
With these framework issues in mind, how should 
fair and equitable systems of health care resource 
allocation be designed? Ways of answering this 
question can be visualized on a rights matrix created 
from two axes contrasting: (a) on the vertical axis, 
the distinction between individual and community 
rights and (b) on the horizontal axis, the distinc-
Figure 1. Priority-setting rights matrix
Pro ce dural 
reme dies
Substantive
reme dies
C ommunity  r ights
Individual  r ights
UK S outh Afr ica NICE (UK)
Except ional  cases 
(UK) L at in  America
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tion between procedural and substantive remedies. 
This produces four conceptions of rights inherent 
in claims to public welfare. In its report on univer-
sal health coverage, WHO invites us to create “a 
vision for the future… because the paths countries 
choose towards universal coverage will necessarily 
differ.”22 The matrix responds to that invitation by 
identifying the logic of the fundamental choices 
that confront us, the crucial differences between 
them, and the broad range of merits, or otherwise, 
of each. Some systems favor one compartment of 
the matrix rather than another, but many (includ-
ing the UK system) comfortably occupy more than 
one compartment, depending on the circumstanc-
es of the individual case. The matrix is created as 
follows and we examine each compartment in turn. 
Community-procedural rights and 
remedies
Rights in the community-procedural segment of 
the matrix are concerned to scrutinize the “reason-
ableness” of decision-making and, if successful, to 
refer the decision back to public authorities to be 
reconsidered in the light of the court’s guidance. 
This describes the accountability for reasonableness 
(“A4R”) approach to priority setting.23 The “right” is 
a guarantee of a fair and reasonable procedure. It is 
not a right to treatment itself. As the South African 
Constitutional Court has said, “Courts are ill-suited 
to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could 
have multiple social and economic consequences 
for the community” and impact adversely upon 
others whose interests are not known to the court.24 
Recognizing the opportunity costs inherent in pub-
lic health promotion, the objective is to ensure that 
fair procedures have identified relevant matters and 
weighed and balanced them properly. 
Procedural rights must be more than mere 
promises of good intentions. For example, Thames 
Valley National Health Service (NHS) commis-
sioners have had a procedure in place for almost 20 
years to balance these claims within a non-statutory 
“priorities committee,” by means of policy recom-
mendations to local health care commissioners. 
The committee is subject to standing procedures on 
membership, regularity of meetings, cross-section 
of expertise, quoracy, voting rights, submission of 
evidence, and so on. The committee of 30 people 
includes NHS clinicians and managers as well as 
a lay chair, legal advisor, and ethical advisor, and 
reviews treatments that local stakeholders submit 
for consideration.25 The committee is guided by 
a clinical effectiveness team, which produces a 
meta-analysis of the clinical research available in 
respect of treatments under consideration. This 
health technology appraisal is paid for by contri-
butions from the Thames Valley commissioners, 
although the priorities committee’s work is unpaid. 
As a means of generating fair, consistent, and 
transparent decisions, the committee is guided 
by the Thames Valley Ethical Framework of eight 
principles: (1) equity, (2) health care need and the 
capacity to benefit, (3) evidence of clinical effec-
tiveness, (4) evidence of cost effectiveness, (5) the 
costs of the treatment and opportunity costs, (6) 
community needs, (7) national policy directives 
and guidance, and (8) exceptional cases.26 The 
committee has created  a suite of policy guidance to 
assist local health authorities which, in the majori-
ty of cases, CCGs adopt without modification. The 
guidance supplements National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) technology appraisals 
and covers a range of treatments from assisted 
conception to gender reassignment, percutaneous 
pulmonary valve implantation, lung metastases, 
bone-anchored hearing aids, and aesthetic/cos-
metic surgery.27 In each case, local clinicians are 
invited to submit evidence to the committee in 
writing and in person. This generates productive 
dialogue between decision-makers at the patient 
and community levels and broad cooperation be-
tween clinicians and resource allocators. Applying 
the ethical framework, the committee may recom-
mend that commissioners purchase treatment for 
Pro ce dural 
reme dies
Substantive
reme dies
C ommunity  r ights
Individual  r ights
UK S outh Afr ica NICE (UK)
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(UK) L at in  America
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the community or decide that the treatment is low 
priority because, for example, it is too expensive, 
the clinical evidence is poor, or better treatments 
are already available. A low-priority treatment is 
not normally funded unless individual patients will 
derive significant clinical benefit (see below). The 
current Thames Valley Priorities Committee com-
menced work in 2013 and has developed around 
70 policy recommendations. Its predecessor, the 
South Central Priorities Committee, developed 
more than 100. Policy recommendations are 
constantly reviewed and updated. Because NHS 
commissioners must follow NICE’s guidance (as 
discussed below), the priorities committee does 
not consider topics previously appraised there. The 
Thames Valley system is less sophisticated (and less 
expensive) than a NICE technology appraisal, but it 
is based on the same logic and purpose.28 Systems 
like this confer community-procedural rights and 
remedies to the extent that their recommendations 
and processes command respect and recognition in 
judicial review.
Judicial review in the UK often favors this 
community-procedural approach. It acknowl-
edges the constraints on the judiciary in terms of 
accountability and technical capacity, yet subjects 
the decision-making process to proper scrutiny 
in respect of the factors considered and the trans-
parency of the process. In England, the NHS 
Constitution has codified the “hard-look” judicial 
review principles developed by the courts so they 
are binding throughout the NHS. Today, the NHS 
Constitution describes patients’ procedural rights 
to transparent and accountable decision making.29 
This is a good example of “destabilisation rights” 
in which judicial intervention provokes a reconsid-
eration of long-standing policies which have never 
been subject to critical re-evaluation.30 As Tushnet 
says, recognizing strong social rights but enforcing 
them only through weak (that is, non-substantive) 
remedies may be attractive for developing “human 
capital” in social welfare rights and a constructive 
relationship with public authorities.31 This defers to 
reasonable systems for decision making. The High 
Court of Israel took the same view in a challenge 
to a decision-making tool applied to assist deci-
sions about expensive cancer treatment where the 
clinical evidence was incomplete. Conceding the 
breadth of reasonable views surrounding these 
questions, it said: 
It is not up to us to recommend the adoption of one 
system of prioritization over another, as long as the 
current criteria comply with the provisions of the 
National Health Insurance Law, and are based on 
relevant and reasonable considerations.32
Importantly, however, procedural review is com-
plicated at the extremes. At one extreme, “hard 
look” scrutiny could be so intense as to browbeat 
decision-makers into conceding every claim. If every 
case is referred back to be reconsidered, then public 
authorities may be so intimidated by the courts that 
they concede every challenge. Clearly, this would 
be a sham; it would be in effect a substantive-rights 
response. The proper balance in UK law has been 
shaped by the case of R v North West Lancashire 
Health Authority, ex parte A, D & G, in which ap-
plicants for sex reassignment surgery succeeded in 
judicial review because the public authority failed 
to demonstrate that its refusal to fund the treatment 
had considered all the relevant circumstances fair-
ly.33 For example, it had demanded clinical evidence 
of effectiveness from randomized controlled trials 
when none were likely to be available for such a 
small cohort of patients, and it had failed to take into 
account the patients’ own particular needs. Instead, 
it introduced a blanket ban on sex reassignment sur-
gery. The court overturned the ban because a rational 
decision-making framework should have considered 
such questions.34 Crucially, recognizing the nature 
of the treatment, it did not order that treatment be 
funded. Rather, it insisted upon fair and transparent 
systems for decision making. 
At the other extreme, some jurisdictions 
prefer procedural review so weak as to render 
decision making unchallengeable. For example, 
the Supreme Court of Ireland has refused to go 
beyond a declaratory remedy. In TD v Minister for 
Education, education and health authorities had 
given specific undertakings to the High Court that 
particular children’s health and education services 
would be provided. However, the undertakings 
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were not performed for many years and the matter 
was returned to the court for a mandatory remedy.35 
The trial court found that the timetable for imple-
mentation had been subject to “culpable slippage” 
through “manifest inefficiency,” which led to “the 
quite scandalous situation which has now obtained 
for years.”36 The court ordered that the minister 
“lives up to his word and carries it into effect…
within the time scale specified…” It stated that it 
was not making or influencing policy; rather it was 
requiring the public authorities to adhere to policy 
of its own making. However, the Supreme Court 
of Ireland emphatically rejected this response and 
set aside the mandatory order. Chief Justice Keane 
said “the granting of an order of this nature is 
inconsistent with the distribution of powers be-
tween the legislative, executive and judicial arms of 
Government mandated by the Constitution.” Even 
though the order simply enforced the executive’s 
own policy, it was unacceptable for precluding its 
right to vary and flex the policy without judicial 
approval. Justice Murray said the consequence of 
a mandatory declaration “would be to undermine 
the answerability of the Executive” with the danger 
that a minister “would be bound to respond that his 
hands were tied by an Order of the High Court…” 
Democratic judicial review, he said
does not… give the Courts jurisdiction to exercise 
rather than review Executive or legislative functions. 
Judicial review permits the Courts to place limits on 
the exercise of Executive or legislative power not 
to exercise it themselves. It deals with the limits of 
policy, not its substance.37
But this declaratory-only response may be so inef-
fective as to rob the right of any meaning.38 Although 
it exposes the authority to public opprobrium and 
may lead to better administrative standards in the 
long run, it does nothing for the litigants in question 
and may appear to render pointless the consider-
able time and expense of litigation. Clearly, then, 
application of the community/procedural response 
must be alive to these dangers at the extremes.
Also, many courts hesitate as the political and 
financial dimensions of the complaint expand. We 
have noted how health care systems are struggling 
from austerity driven by the politics of neoliberalism. 
In an English case, for example, a public authority 
challenged the sufficiency of its annual financial 
allocation from the central government treasury. 
The House of Lords rejected its claim. The challenge 
was to the exercise of political judgment. Deferring 
to the authority of Parliament, the Law Lords said 
that it was constitutionally inappropriate to quash 
financial planning guidance by the secretary of state, 
implicitly approved by Parliament: “these are matters 
of political judgment for him and for the House of 
Commons. They are not matters for judges.”39 Even 
with this procedural review, therefore, courts strug-
gle to adjudicate between the “polycentric” claims of 
competing government departments.40
Individual-procedural rights and remedies
A comprehensive resource allocation system must 
also be capable of reassuring individual patients as 
to its competence and, essentially, its compassion 
and humanity. A necessary consequence is that a 
general policy not to fund a treatment must be sup-
plemented by a procedure for reviewing individual 
patients who possess plausible evidence that their 
circumstances merit an exceptional response. This 
is an individual-procedural right in the sense that it 
cannot guarantee access to treatment irrespective 
of cost. Yet it can reassure individuals that their 
individual circumstances have been considered 
properly in a way that is not possible when decisions 
are made at the community level. The argument is 
not that the patient has an exceptional illness. Rath-
er, it is that the patient’s circumstances are such that 
they will derive significant benefit from a treatment 
not normally visible under the assessment made 
within the community-procedural approach. 
Individual-procedural rights applications 
should be exceptional. Exceptional cases have 
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opportunity costs of their own: inescapably, “ex-
ceptionality” procedures require considerable 
commitment from doctors and managers with 
other demands on their time. For this reason, the 
patient and doctor present evidence that this pa-
tient is likely to derive significant clinical benefit 
from this treatment. For example, principle 8 of the 
Thames Valley Ethical Framework promises that:
There will be no blanket bans on treatments since 
there may be cases in which a patient has special 
circumstances which present an exceptional need for 
treatment. Individual cases are considered by each 
respective CCG [Clinical Commissioning Group]. 
Each case will be considered on its own merits in 
light of the clinical evidence. CCGs have procedures 
in place to consider such exceptional cases through 
their Individual Funding Request Process [IFR].
This is supported by a system in which exceptional 
funding applications are submitted as Individual 
Funding Requests, together with supporting clin-
ical evidence, to an IFR panel. This system was 
challenged in AC v. West Berkshire Primary Care 
Trust.41 The applicant was a male-to-female trans-
gender patient who had received the treatment 
recommended locally. The patient had received 
hormone therapy intended to develop breast tissue, 
but remained dissatisfied with her body shape. 
Accordingly, she applied for prosthetic breast 
enlargement. However, the IFR panel rejected the 
application because this treatment is not available 
to women generally and it would be unfair and in-
consistent to offer it to this patient as an exceptional 
case. Was it fair to compare this patient’s rights 
with those of the general community of women 
with similar concerns or, as she argued, should her 
position be compared to the much smaller number 
of transgender women undergoing male-to-female 
transition? There is merit on both sides, but the 
court found for the health authority and endorsed 
the reasonableness of its refusal to fund this treat-
ment in fairness to the larger community of “natal” 
women (as the court described this group).
By contrast, in Otley v Barking and Dagenham 
PCT,42 the applicant was a lung cancer patient who 
had not responded well to the normal treatments. 
She had paid for experimental treatment with 
Avastin, more with a view to extending her surviv-
al by a matter of months than in expectation of a 
cure. Otley argued that she should have access to 
Avastin paid for by the NHS on evidence that her 
biochemical markers following treatment indicated 
that it might extend her life and that she was young 
compared to other lung cancer patients. The court 
said that her response was sufficiently exceptional 
and the experimental treatment was preferable. 
Similarly, in SB v. NHS England,43 the patient was 
a boy suffering from phenylketonuria (PKU) and 
autism. Untreated PKU damages intellectual de-
velopment, and for most children it is effectively 
managed through a low-protein diet. However, the 
patient’s autism made a consistent dietary regime 
impossible and he argued that this made him an 
exceptional case (of about 0.03 percent of the pop-
ulation). The court agreed that NHS England was 
duty-bound to consider whether the patient should 
have exceptional access to sapropterin dihydro-
chloride (Kuvan), and referred the case back for 
reconsideration. Although this remedy is strictly 
procedural, its substantive implications for the de-
fendants are obvious.44 
These cases illuminate also how UK courts 
generally accept that exceptionality should rest on 
clinical evidence, rather than personal or social cir-
cumstances. For example, in R (on app Longstaff) 
v Newcastle NHS PCT, the patient suffered from 
hemophilia and had an understandable distrust 
of human blood products following his brother’s 
death from contaminated blood. However, with the 
improvement in techniques for removing blood vi-
ruses, his request to be treated with more expensive, 
genetically modified blood products was rejected 
because it was not clinically necessary.45 Similar 
“exceptionality” discussions have occurred in cases 
of terminally-ill mothers who have requested treat-
ment to extend their lives so that they might spend 
as much time as possible resettling their young 
children.46 These troubling cases obviously cause 
considerable concern.
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Community-substantive rights and 
remedies
NICE provides an example of community-substan-
tive rights. The institute was introduced as a political 
expedient to encourage greater consistency among 
health authority commissioners in England who 
were otherwise free to differ from one another. This 
created disquiet because it could give rise to differ-
ent policies governing access to treatment between 
health authorities. Consistency has improved after 
regulations were introduced requiring commission-
ers to purchase all the treatments NICE recommends 
in its technology appraisal guidance (TAG).47 NICE 
has published over 300 TAGs, and patients may 
seek judicial review to enforce entitlement to the 
listed medicines.48 This political initiative is having 
increasing community impact as NICE expands its 
work. NICE also publishes non-mandatory recom-
mendations and these too may have a substantive 
impact on community rights. In Rose v. Thanet CCG, 
NICE published non-binding recommendations 
concerning the freezing of human reproductive 
material for patients undergoing chemotherapy.49 
The defendant health authority failed to adopt the 
guidance because it disagreed with it, although it 
could not present persuasive reasons why. The court 
held this to be irrational. NICE is an internationally 
recognized authority; if a health authority intends 
to depart from its non-mandatory guidelines, it is 
entitled to do so if it can advance cogent reasons for 
its decision. The case was referred back to be recon-
sidered. Here too, although a procedural response, 
the community-substantive implications for the de-
fendants are obvious because evidence of the quality 
the court demanded was unlikely to be available.
Judges may also create community-substan-
tive remedies on their own initiative. For example, 
in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa ordered 
the state to remove restrictions on patients’ access 
to the drug nevirapine, a treatment to reduce the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, but 
left to government discretion how best to make it 
available.50 So too, in a case involving large numbers 
of homeless people claiming constitutional rights 
to housing and shelter, the court ordered, without 
prescribing specific standards, that the defendants: 
within four months of the date of this order to 
deliver a report or reports under oath, stating what 
steps it has taken to comply with its constitutional 
and statutory obligations as declared in this order, 
what future steps it will take in that regard, and 
when such future steps will be taken.51 
Recognizing the political challenge raised by 
opportunity costs, this returns the matter to legis-
lative policy-makers for a solution.
Similarly, the German Constitutional Court in 
the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits case of 2012 considered 
the levels of welfare available to support asylum 
seekers. Welfare levels had not increased since 1993, 
and the court noted that inflation had eroded the 
real terms value of those benefits by 30%, rendering 
the level of subsistence incompatible with a “dig-
nified minimum existence.”52 Although the court 
imposed a constitutional duty upon government 
to recalculate the benefits, it expressly left the ways 
and means of doing so to the discretion of parlia-
ment. The judges recognized the substantive rights 
of an entire class represented by these litigants and 
insisted on a response equally available to the en-
tire group. In this way, it encouraged policies which 
grappled properly with the public dimension of the 
challenge. So too in the UK in the asylum seeker 
case of Limbuela. Government passed regulations 
which made it impossible for those who delayed 
their application for asylum to work or to obtain 
social welfare. The case involved an applicant for 
asylum who applied outside the time limits, without 
access to food, or shelter and who often slept rough, 
outside at night in the cold and wet. The House of 
Lords found that the action of the state amounted 
to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights. It decided 
that substantive social welfare had to be provided 
to everyone in these circumstances pending the 
resolution of their application for asylum.53
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to in-
troduce community-substantive rights has been 
from the Colombian Constitutional Court in a 
case that sought to set up new structures around 
the health care system, emphasizing the role of 
equality, accountability and participation.54 Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL) in India promotes a similar 
community-substantive approach.55 Judicial com-
missioners may be appointed to collect evidence 
and make recommendations to the court, but this 
too, while successful in some areas, is confronted 
by challenges.56 For example, in PIL to reduce fe-
male infanticide and feticide the Supreme Court 
of India observed that “neither the State Govern-
ments nor the Central Government has taken 
appropriate actions for its implementation” (despite 
robust statutory regulations banning the practice).57 
Public authorities were ordered to implement the 
regulations, monitor their implementation, make 
quarterly returns of progress, take appropriate 
action, conduct public awareness campaigns, and 
introduce and enforce a code of conduct for public 
authorities. The public authorities were required to 
return to the court within three months to report 
on their progress. Similar action has been taken 
in respect of enforcing rights to education, health, 
and freedom from sexual harassment. Entering 
into collaboration to enforce existing regulations 
of significant public interest, based on reason and 
transparency, provides a good example of the pow-
er of PIL to encourage change.58 On the other hand, 
the substantive-community response of PIL has not 
improved the systemic under-investment in health 
care by successive Indian governments.59 
Individual-substantive rights and remedies
Latin American jurisdictions are often cited as the 
paradigm example of individual-substantive rights. 
Within this logic, public rights are enforceable as if 
they are private contractual rights arising within a 
contract for private health insurance. Community 
interests are not foremost. In Brazil, for example, it 
is reported that 97% of the rapidly increasing claims 
for access to health care are made by individual 
litigants requesting particular treatment.60 In one 
case, the Supreme Federal Tribunal determined 
that drug eculizumab (Soliris), should be funded for 
an orphan disease at an annual cost per patient of 
more than US$400,000.61 But Latin America is not 
alone. The European Court of Justice has developed 
similar, individualized rights to publicly funded 
health care from the principles governing the free 
movement of services in the European Union. In a 
series of decisions, the court has promoted the idea 
that, as a general rule, patients are entitled to obtain 
treatment away from their own member state when 
(i) the treatment is included within the basket of 
services available and regarded as “normal in the 
professional circles concerned” and (ii) it cannot 
be obtained at home “without undue delay.”62 As 
it said in R (Watts) v. Bedfordshire PCT, although 
resourcing restraints are relevant in the extreme 
event of a “risk of seriously undermining the finan-
cial balance of a social security system,” a refusal 
to authorize treatment in the EU was not justified 
by waiting lists based on clinical priorities without 
carrying out, in the individual case in question, an 
objective medical assessment of the patient’s medi-
cal condition.63  The court continued, 
where the delay arising from such waiting lists 
appears to exceed in the individual case concerned 
an acceptable period having regard to an objective 
medical assessment of all the circumstances of 
the situation and the clinical needs of the person 
concerned, the competent institution may not 
refuse the authorisation sought on the grounds of 
the existence of those waiting lists, [or] an alleged 
distortion of the normal order of priorities linked to 
the relative urgency of the cases to be treated.64
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Here too, by disregarding those not represented 
before the court, the court blinds itself to the op-
portunity costs upon the community of patients 
generally.65
The challenge of “individual-substantive” 
remedies is most sensitive in applications for ex-
pensive, “last chance, life-saving,” pharmaceuticals 
where evidence of efficacy is disputed. Measured on 
the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) scale, drugs 
of this nature may do no harm and may even assist 
a small proportion of patients for a limited time, 
yet absorb disproportionate resources otherwise 
available for other patients. Some might defend 
this as protecting an “existential minimum” com-
mensurate with human dignity. Such an approach 
may be extended to patients with potentially fatal 
conditions by permitting substantive rights of ac-
cess to treatments even when there is incomplete 
clinical evidence it will be effective. In Nikolaus,66 
the patient suffered Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
a progressive and fatal disease for which there is 
no cure. The German Constitutional Court found 
that the constitution guaranteed those suffering 
a life-threatening disease for which there was no 
generally accepted treatment, access to medically 
approved treatment, even if a positive influence on 
the disease was unlikely. However, a single-minded 
“rule of rescue” which ignores finite public budgets 
exposes the community to considerable risk.67 
Unrestricted individual-substantive responses 
are poor examples of Sabel and Simon’s “destabi-
lisation rights,” which encourage a more secure 
and constructive platform upon which to exercise 
public duties.68 The danger is obvious. Lack of re-
straint over individual-substantive rights, far from 
encouraging constructive “destabilisation,” could 
be destructive of the rights of the many.
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has taken the opposite view in respect of 
patients seeking life-saving treatment outside their 
own health system. In N. v. United Kingdom, the 
ECtHR reconsidered its “individual-substantive” 
rights approach previously adopted in D. v. United 
Kingdom.69 The case concerned an HIV-positive 
visitor to the UK who was offered full access to 
NHS treatment while staying in the country. When 
her visitor visa expired, immigration authorities 
sought to remove her, knowing she would be un-
likely to receive further treatment in her home 
state. Retreating from their decision in the case 
of D., the court declined to insist on a substantive 
remedy. Instead, it referred to the “search for a fair 
balance between the demands of the general inter-
est of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights...” 
It continued,
social and economic differences between countries, 
entail that the level of treatment available in the 
Contracting State and the country of origin may 
vary considerably… [However] Article  3 does not 
place an obligation on the Contracting State to 
alleviate such disparities through the provision of 
free and unlimited health care to all aliens without 
a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to 
the contrary would place too great a burden on the 
Contracting States.70
This denial of individual-substantive rights is diffi-
cult, but it acknowledges the macro-implications to 
states of unrestricted rights of access. Unattractive 
as it is from a patient-centered perspective, it clearly 
locates its analysis within a community-based ap-
proach to rights.
Conclusion
Is judicialization a friend or a foe? The rights ma-
trix illuminates the range of approaches available 
to courts, their costs and benefits. If we accept 
the framework issues discussed above, that is, 
that opportunity costs engage everyone’s rights 
and a central objective of public welfare rights is 
to mitigate health inequality, then the logic of the 
community-procedural approach (“A4R”) is the 
most compelling starting point to preserve legisla-
tive political will and promote community rights. 
Equally, a number of factors may modify this ideal. 
Community-procedural approaches are most likely 
to succeed in an environment of trust and dialogue 
between health managers and judges, supported 
by satisfactory priority-setting systems. But this 
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approach cannot always dominate all others. First, 
even within the community-procedural dimension, 
individual circumstances sometimes merit consid-
eration for exceptional clinical reasons. Second, 
especially in serious cases of hardship, a substantive 
approach to community interests may be justified 
when entire groups of patients have been left behind. 
Indeed, as NICE demonstrates, community-sub-
stantive rights are also recognized as a response 
to the “politics” of resource allocation.71 Lastly, 
in jurisdictions of limited trust between resource 
allocators and the judiciary, or where patients’ 
rights are thought to be inadequate, judges may 
feel justified to take a more robust, individual-sub-
stantive approach both for the benefit of individual 
applicants and, indeed, to attempt to destabilize 
the system to kick start improvement. However, as 
the funds available for public welfare continue to 
erode relative to demand, there is a serious threat to 
community interests if the individual-substantive 
approach becomes the predominant response. 
Perhaps it would help if judges were more 
transparent about which approach they were en-
gaging and why. The matrix illuminates the costs 
and benefits of judicial policy, and transparency 
would assist and clarify debate. That said, we 
should not overestimate the capacity of national 
courts to respond to these challenges alone for 
two reasons. First, while the primary concern of 
this discussion has been priority setting in health 
care, do not forget health status more generally, and 
the social determinants of health in particular. Yet 
this engages the polycentric needs of other depart-
ments of state with complimentary responsibility 
for the environment, employment, food, housing, 
and education,72 about which, as we have noted, 
courts find adjudication very difficult. Second, as 
the “debt-state’s” obligations to private creditors 
expands and private investment underpins public 
welfare finances, the forum for dispute resolution 
will tend to move away from national judges into 
the less secure (and vastly more expensive) hands 
of international arbitrators.73 The matrix is helpful, 
but for the future, as concern about health and 
health care escalates, national courts and, indeed, 
national politics, may have a smaller role to play.
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